University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Philosophy

10-1985

British Hermeneutics and the Genesis of
Empiricism
Gary Shapiro
University of Richmond, gshapiro@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-facultypublications
Part of the History of Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Shapiro, Gary. "British Hermeneutics and the Genesis of Empiricism." Phenomenological Inquiry, October 1985, 29-44.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Studies

29

II. STU.DIES
Approaches to Paul Ricoeur's
Hermeneutics of Action
British Hermeneutics and the Genesis
of Empiricism

Gary Shapiro

In an essay of 1961, "The History of Philosophy and Historicity," Paul
Ricoeur has suggested that the narratives which we construct of the
history of philosophy tend either toward excessive integration or disintegration. On the first alternative we tend to view the history of philosophy,
or a segment of it, as a succession of systems understood from the perspective of that system closest to our own philosophical inclinations; on the
second alternative we tend toward a dispersive attention tm,vard specific
problems, thinkers, and texts. Neither approach is satisfying, but Ricoeur
maintains that in the history of philosophy. as contrasted to other historical and narrative forms, we are forced toward either the integrative or the
dispersive goal. Both tendencies represent a suppression of history. Yet the
history of philosophy, like other histories. Ricoeur suggests, can disclose
historicity, even in the paradoxical form of showing that in fact the
events-thoughts, texts. philosophical careers-of which it is composed do
not succeed in maintaining an absolute singularity or dissolving themselves into an absolute system:
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history is history only to the extent that it has reached neither absolute discourse nor absolute singularity-to the extent that the meaning of it remains
confused and entangled. Lived history is all that which happens prior to its
decomposition and suppression by the system and singularity. 1

Ricoeur suggests then that we will never reach either ultimate Hegelian
systematicity nor Nietzschean difference in philosophical practice or in the
history of philosophy, but that either can serve as a regulative idea for the
philosopher. The philosophical historian of philosophy can only see the
historicity of his subject matter by an awareness of both.
In the spirit of these pointers from Ricoeur I want to look at some
narrative tendencies within the history of philosophy that are relevant to
the continuing confrontation and series of adjustments between philosophical analysis as it has been practiced in the English speaking world and
the hermeneutical tendencies within phenomenological and continental
thought. Let us begin by noting that one way in which many philosophical
projects acknowledge historicity rather than seeking an elusive universal
system or an impossible individuality is through their concern with the
discourse of others, especially as found in the canonical texts of a religious or
literary tradition, or in those of philosophy itself. To be concerned with the
other's texts requires an admission that one's own discourse is embedded
in history and is not fully pliable to either of the two poles identified in
Ricouer's analysis. In the re-examination of the history of philosophy that
is taking place today in the light of such tendencies as the phenomenological hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur, Derrida's deconstruction of the
text and Foucault's exploration of the tangled genealogies of knowledge
and power, it may be useful to take another look at the hermeneutics which
does not simply operate on the field of the history of philosophy but which
is already part of that whose history we would narrate.
T.W. Adorno raises the question of philosophy's relation to hermeneutical thought in an essay on Walter Benjamin. He observes that Benjamin
distanced himself from what he.saw as philosophy by maintaining "a
determined Alexandrianism," philosophizing in his own manner only by
means of commenting on already existing texts. Here as elsewhere Adorno
praises Benjamin's transvaluation of the notion of the sacred text, while
regretting his neglect of many dimensions of traditional philosophy which
might have given more power to his insights:
For him philosophy consisted essentially in commentary and criticism ... The
concern of philosophy with previously existent, codified doctrines is less foreign

